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A dramatic  rise in shareowner power and improvements in corporate governance tan
be achieved in the next few years by expanding the role of proxy advisory firms. This
will require changing  the way such firms are paid. They are now paid directly by
investors who buy their advice; but this arrangement suffers from a free-rider
problem. Instead, they should be paid by each corporation about which they are
advising, in accordance with shareholder vote so as to preclude management
influence. This arrangement would make it economically feasible for advisory firms to
expand their services, becoming proactive like relational investors. Any proxy advisor
other than the market leader Stands to gain tremendously by initiating this new
System. lt would eliminate the natura1  monopoly feature of the current System, and
spread the tost more equitably across all shareowners. lt would also enable proxy
advisory ftrms to market their Services to individual investors via the internet.
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USA. See www.corpmon.com/publications.htm  for future Versions of this Paper,
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Mark Rubinstein. Copyright 0 by Mark Latham.1. Introduction
Managers of large corporations sometimes do not act in the best interests of their
employers, the shareowners. This problem has troubled economists and business
people for centuries, and although progress has been made, the costs of this conflict
of interests remain substantial.’ Especially when no shareholder owns more than 5
per cent of the firm, no one has enough incentive to monitor management, because
the private benefit is small - the “free rider” problem.
Proxy advisory firms provide some monitoring services to shareowners. They advise
institutional investors on how to vote their shares, regarding director elections,
executive compensation, mergers and acquisitions, capital structure changes, social
issues, and other corporate policy matters. Each investor chooses its advisor(s), and
pays a fee of $3 or more per meeting (normally one meeting per year per stock held).
While this arrangement lets investors share the costs of monitoring, a free-rider
problem remains because hiring a proxy advisor is voluntary and has some cost.
Investors face a free-rider problem when deciding whether and how much advice to
buy, because advice helps them vote intelligently, which helps all shareholders.
Baums and von Randov\i! proposed a solution to essentially this same problem in a
German context: having “voting agents” (much like proxy advisory firms) paid by the
corporation, but selected by shareowner vote.
This paper shows how to apply their solution to proxy advisors, and explores some
attractive developments that may result. Section 2 explains the free-rider problem.
Section 3 proposes a solution to the free-rider problem for advisory firms. Section 4
describes the likely expansion from advising to a more proactive role. Section 5
shows the potential for proxy advising to become a retail internet business. Section 6
discusses the legal steps required to implement the proposed system. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2. The Free-Rider Problem and Its Solution
“Let George do it.” In situations where there is a task to be performed for the public
good, rationally selfish individuals will tend to do less than their share, resulting in
inadequate performance of the task. Any work you do for the public good benefits
you only slightly, while everyone else gets a “free ride” on your efforts. If we relied on
residents to voluntarily clean city streets, we would be walking through trash every
day. instead, we levy taxes and pay professional cleaners.
Likewise, a shareholder making an effort to vote intelligently benefits all shareholders,
since voting affects corporate policy which affects profits. Therefore a rationallyselfish shareowner owning less than 100 per cent of the firm, will make less effort
than is optimal in terms of cost versus total benefit. Most shareowners of large
American firms own less than 1 per cent of the firm, making this rational voter apathy
extreme. That is why as much decision-making as possible is delegated to
professional corporate managers. Some issues, however, are so important or so
fraught with conflict of interest that they must be put to shareholder vote.
While most individual investors do not even bother voting their stock, institutional
investors do vote, partly because their larger holdings give them more of the benefit
of their intelligent voting, and partly because of laws obliging them to vote. Intelligent
voting on corporate policy requires study of the company’s situation to form an
opinion independent of management. Institutional investors do some of the
necessary research themselves, but also hire proxy advisory firms to do it for them.
This makes economic sense, because with hundreds of institutional investors holding
shares in a given company, it is not worth the cost to generate hundreds of
independent opinions on each policy proposal. It is more efficient to pool the cost of
research by hiring a proxy advisory firm, as long as it is independent of the company
being voted on.
Nonetheless, the free-rider problem remains. Even the largest institutional investors
rarely hold as much as 5 per cent of a company’s stock, so they get less than l/20 of
the benefit of the time and money they spend on voting intelligently. Therefore the
proxy advisory industry today must be smaller than would be best for investors.
Investors would buy more advice if they could get 100 per cent of the benefit to
balance against their cost. For example, when shareowners vote for directors,
advisory firms let them know which directors have missed more than 25 per cent of
the past year’s board meetings. This is a very crude measure of effectiveness. A
director can warm that seat every meeting but still be ineffective. However, more
accurate assessments, such as by interviewing directors, require more time, more
expertise, and thus more money.
The existing proxy advisory system is like having each city resident decide whether to
contribute to the fund for hiring professionals to clean all city streets. There is still a
strong incentive to choose to contribute very little, leaving plenty of dirt on the streets.
But we can create a payment system analogous to a citywide tax. It makes sense to
pay as a group for something that benefits the whole group.
3. Competition for Proxy Advisory Fees
It is easier to think about these issues in terms of specific numbers. The example
presented in this section is illustrative but fictional.
The leading American proxy advisory firms are Institutional Shareholder Services
(ISS), Proxy Monitor (PM), and Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC). ISS
has by far the greatest market sharew3 Suppose ISS and PM are both covering
2proposals to be voted on by IBM shareowners. ISS has 1000 clients paying $3 each
per meeting (think of one shareholder meeting per year), collecting $3000 for its
advice. PM has 60 clients paying $3 each, collecting $180 for its advice.
What’s wrong with this picture? The problem is that this business is a natural
monopoly. Once an advisory firm covers a company and does the work to decide
how best to vote, it can sell that advice to as many clients as possible, with minimal
further cost. Since the per-client fee is $3 for both ISS and PM, ISS is not pressed to
provide better advice even though it is collecting much more in fees. With that
structure of costs and revenues, once an advisory firm has a commanding lead in
market share, it is difficult for competitors to have a viable business. PM has a long
way to come from behind, and will have difficulty offering a competitive product
because it is funded by so little revenue.
Here is a radically different business strategy for PM: First, it gives away some
advice for free, both on the worldwide web and by dial-up link to its computer. It
chooses a few high-profile companies like RJR-Nabisco, where there is some
controversy between management and shareowners. It also chooses a few of the
companies for which proxies can now be voted on the web. Before the annual
shareholders’ meeting of each chosen company, PM puts out its voting
recommendations for anyone to read.
Second, PM announces that it will provide similar public voting advice for any
company for a fee of $200, provided that the fee is paid by the company with the
approval of a majority of its shareowners. If the company pays, then in effect all
shareowners are paying, with the extra benefit of reducing corporate taxes.
Would anyone take PM’s offer? Management is likely to oppose the idea, because
they prefer not to be monitored. It would require a binding shareholder proposal,
leaving management no discretion. The $200 spread across all shareowners is a
trivial cost, while providing substantial benefits. Institutions that had been buying
ISS’s advice could switch to PM for those firms covered publicly by PM, saving some
fees. Those who were not buying professional advice could then have access to
some. Even those who have no intention to use the PM advice would still benefit
from the improved quality of voting by others. What good does it do for institutions to
pay for advice on contentious issues, only to lose those contests because many
unadvised shares are blindly voted with management in the current system?
Therefore shareholders generally can be expected to support this new proposal.
$200 is of course a special introductory offer, a loss-leader price to launch this new
market channel. Once the channel is opened and investors learn how it works, many
rapid developments will follow. PM will raise the price. Competitors will start using
the channel. Quality and range of services will expand, and spread globally. ISS,
PM, other existing advisors and new entrants would compete on a more equal
footing, because the company-pay fee structure gives each the same number of
clients - all the shareowners of the given company. This will solve the natural
monopoly problem without government intrusion.
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